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JURISDICTION
A*

August 13, 1997, Order and Judgment.

The Judgment and Order appealed from was entered August 13,
(R. 290-2861.)

1997.

Plaintiffs served a Motion for New Trial on

August 22, 1997, which was within ten days of the Judgment and
Order.

(R. 294-293.)

The Court's Order Denying Motion for New

Trial was entered November 6, 1997.

(R. 345-342.)

Defendants

filed their notice of appeal less than 3 0 days later, on November
28, 1997. (R. 347-346.)

The notice was timely.

Utah R. App. P.

4(a).
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Supreme Court by Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996) . The matter was poured over to the

1

The pages in the record are numbered in reverse chronological order, and as a result the pagination on each document runs
in reverse order.

Utah Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
B.

Claims of Robert Steele.

Appellants' brief claims on page 2 that "this appeal is made
by Jack Dansie and Bob Steele."

Although Robert Steele and Juab

Gypsum, L.L.C. were respondents to the order to show cause (R. 156155), only J. W. Dansie and Jean Dansie appealed.

(R. 347-346.)

This court lacks jurisdiction to consider the purported appeal by
Robert Steele.
318 (1988) .

See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312,

Robert Steele also did not join the motion for new

trial, so any appeal by him would have been untimely.

Notwith-

standing any action this court may take with respect to J. W.
Dansie, therefore, the underlying Order will remain effective as to
Robert Steele and Juab Gypsum, L.L.C.
C.

Prohibition on Sales to Ashqrove-Durkee.

It is important to delineate exactly what J. W. Dansie is appealing.

The June 18, 1996, order prohibited J. W. Dansie from

selling gypsum to Ashgrove-Durkee for 18 months or until Nephi
Sandstone's

gypsum

occurred later.

failed

to

meet

specifications,

whichever

J. W. Dansie argued below that the order was in

error, and that the limitation should only exist until the earlier
of the passage of 18 months or the failure to meet specifications.
(R. 172.)

The trial court rejected that claim and specifically

2

found that the June 18, 1996, Order properly reflected the parties'
agreement. (R. 2 66.)
J. W. Dansie did not appeal from or otherwise challenge the
June 18, 1996, Order.

J. W. Dansie does not claim that the June

18, 1996, Order is ambiguous. The June 18, 1996, Order is binding,
i.e., J. W. Dansie, Robert Steele and Juab Gypsum, L.L.C. may not
contact or contract with Ashgrove-Durkee for 18 months or until
Nephi Sandstone gypsum fails to meet specifications, whichever last
occurs.

J. W. Dansie does not and cannot appeal the underlying

order, but only the preventative injunction (the August 13, 1997,
order) which seeks to prevent violation of the order.
Even if J. W.Dansie were to prevail on his appeal and obtain
a reversal of the preventative injunction, the underlying order
would

still

remain

in

force.

This

Court's

jurisdiction

is

therefore limited to the issue of whether J. W. Dansie must seek
prior court approval before selling gypsum to Ashgrove Durkee. The
primary issue addressed in the brief, however, is whether the court
could prohibit

sales to Ashgrove-Durkee

definite period of time.

for a potentially

in-

The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider

that issue.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Where

a

party

had

previously

sold

materials

to

a

particular customer in violation of a court order did the court
abuse its discretion by requiring specific permission from the
court before making any future sales to that customer?
3

2.
entered

Is a court order prohibiting sales to a single customer,
as

a

unreasonable

sanction

and

for

therefore

contempt

of

unenforceable

court,
simply

inherently
because

the

prohibition may continue indefinitely?
These issues arise in the context of an injunction issued by
the trial court.

The propriety of an injunction is reviewed for

abuse of discretion.

System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P. 2d 421,

425 (Utah 1983).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellees do not contend that there are any constitutional
provisions,

statutes, ordinances, rules, or

interpretation

regulations

is determinative of the appeal or of

whose

essential

importance to the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a civil proceeding seeking

sanctions for civil contempt of court. The proceeding arose in the
context of a civil lawsuit concerning an agreement for the purchase
of a business.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. On November

4, 1996, defendants filed their Motion for Order to Show Cause (R.
147-145), claiming that plaintiffs and Robert Steele had violated
a court order entered June 18, 1996.
issued the requested

(R. 144-138.)

order to show cause.

The court

(R. 156-155.)

An

evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause was held February 11
and March 25, 1997.

(R. 222-221, 240-239.)
4

On June 11, 1997, the court issued its ruling finding against
plaintiffs on the issues related to Robert Steele, but finding in
favor of plaintiffs on the issues related to J. W. Dansie.
261-241.)

(R.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 285-263) and

an Order and Judgment (R. 290-286) were entered on August 13, 1997.
On August 22, 1997, plaintiffs served a Motion for New Trial.
(R. 294-293.)

The court issued a ruling denying the motion on

September 19, 1997 (R. 340-339), and a formal Order Denying Motion
for

New

Trial

was

entered

November

6,

1997.

(R.

345-342.)

Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on November 28, 1997.

(R.

347-346.)
C.

Statement of Facts.

On January 10, 1995, plaintiffs sued their son, Craig Dansie,
and

their

son-in-law,

Bruce

H.

Evans, claiming

breach

of

an

agreement whereby Craig and Bruce were to become owners of Nephi
Sandstone Corporation.

(R. 6-1.)

Craig and Bruce answered the

complaint and filed a counterclaim against plaintiffs asserting
that Nephi Sandstone was failing and unprofitable when Craig and
Bruce took over operations under an agreement whereby they would
purchase the business from plaintiffs.

The counterclaim asserted

that plaintiffs had violated the agreement by attempting to remove
a certain gypsum mine, known as the Levan Mine, from the assets of
Nephi Sandstone Corporation.

The counterclaim also asserted that

plaintiffs had libeled and slandered Craig and Bruce by statements
to customers.

(R. 16-9.)

5

The

issues

Stipulation

filed

raised

in

February

the

complaint

29, 1996.

were

resolved

(R. 137-130.)

by

a

Several

individuals not party to the action, including Robert Steele,
acknowledged the Stipulation and agreed to be bound by it.

(R.

13 0.)

An Order approving the Stipulation was entered June 18,

1996.

(R. 144-138.)
Paragraph 1 of the Order prohibited each of the parties from

making any "derogatory, demeaning or belittling comments about any
of the other parties to any individual."

Paragraph 3 of the Order

included the following:
3.
J. W. Dansie and Robert Steele,
together with all other owners of the Juab
Gypsum, L.L.C., are ordered not to attempt to
contact or enter into any contracts with
Ashgrove Cement Company-Leamington; Ashgrove
Cement Company-Durkee, Oregon; Ashgrove Cement
Company-Inkom, Idaho; Soda Springs Phosphate;
Morrison
Fertilizer; Agri-Nu;
and
North
Pacific Trading, which are all customers of
Nephi Sandstone Corporation, for a period of
eighteen months from the date of the parties
[sic] Stipulation (February 12, 1996) or for
so long as the gypsum from Nephi Sandstone's
operation of the Salt Creek Mine continues to
meet
Ashgrove
Cement7s
specifications,
whichever is later.
The trial court found that J. W. Dansie, notwithstanding the
prohibition

in

the

court

order

against

making

derogatory

statements, made derogatory comments about Craig and Bruce to a
number of individuals. (R. 277 f 50.)

The court also found that

when Jason Dansie, Craig's son and J. W.'s grandson, went to
deliver something to J. W., that J. W. "began to shake and yell
that there was going to be a bloody mess.
6

He was angry at Craig

and Bruce and called them profane and offensive names, asserting
that Craig and Bruce were greedy."

(R. 277 f 51.)

The trial court also found that J. W. Dansie had sold at least
19 carloads of gypsum to Ashgrove-Durkee. (R. 281 f 25.)

J. W.

Dansie claimed that the shipment to Ashgrove-Durkee was permissible
because

Nephi

Sandstone

specifications.2
two reasons.

had

failed

(R. 281 f 26.)

to

meet

Ashgrove-Durkee7s

The court rejected this claim for

First, the court found that J. W. Dansie did not

learn of the alleged breach of specifications until after he had
agreed to ship the gypsum. (R. 278 f 42.)

Second, the court found

that Nephi Sandstone did not fail to meet the Ashgrove-Durkee
specifications. (R. 279.)

The court found that Nephi Sandstone

lost $10,525.00 in profits by reason of the improper shipment of
gypsum. (R. 276 f 56.)
As

a

sanction

for

J.

W.

Dansie's

derogatory

statements

concerning his son and son-in-law, the court imposed a fine of
$1,000.00

and

ordered

community service.

that J.

W.

Dansie perform

80 hours

of

Mr. Dansie's co-respondent, Robert Steele, has

2

The first claim was that Ashgrove-Durkee discovered some
large rocks in the bottom of the railcars used to ship the gypsum.
The court found that the rocks were not gypsum and were not similar
to the kind of rock adjacent to the gypsum mine. (R. 280 f 34.) J.
W. Dansie also asserted a failure to meet delivery timetables.
Nephi Sandstone's purchase order with Ashgrove-Durkee required that
they ship five cars of gypsum per week from mid-March to midNovember, 1996.
(R. 280, 1 35.) During that time frame, Nephi
Sandstone shipped 192 cars of gypsum which averaged more than five
cars per week. There was a period of 21 days, however, when no
gypsum was shipped.
The trial court found that this did not
constitute a failure to meet specifications. (R. 279.)
7

submitted a letter to the court claiming that J. W. Dansie has
performed the community service.

(R. 341.)

As a sanction for the improper sales to Ashgrove-Durkee, the
court imposed a fine of $1,000.00 and also entered an injunction
prohibiting J. W. Dansie or his company, Juab Gypsum, L.L.C., from
selling materials to Ashgrove-Durkee "unless or until [the] court
makes a finding that Nephi Sandstone has breached a specification
or unless or until the passage of time provided in the [June 18,
1996] order."

(R. 288.)

J. W. Dansie has appealed that order.

(R. 347.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellants claim the trial court's order creates an improper
non-competition agreement.

The court's order was not, however, an

agreement; it was an injunction to prohibit violation of a prior
court order.

Where J. W. Dansie had previously violated a court

order and had attempted to excuse that violation by an after-thefact claim that defendants' gypsum failed to meet minimum product
specifications, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
requiring J. W. Dansie to seek prior court approval before engaging
in future sales which may violate the court order.
Even if the court order is viewed as an agreement, however, it
is still proper.

A contractual limitation on competition can be

enforced if it is reasonable in its restrictions as to time and
area.

A majority of courts have held that an indefinite time

restriction may be reasonable if the area of restraint is narrow.
8

The area of restraint in this case is limited to a single existing
customer of the defendants.
tially

Even though the restraint is poten-

indefinite, the restraint

is reasonable under the cir-

cumstances .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN REQUIRING PRIOR COURT APPROVAL
OF SALES BY J. W. DANSIE TO ASHGROVE-DURKEE.
On June 18, 1996, the trial court, by Order based on the
stipulation of the parties, prohibited "J. W. Dansie and Robert
Steele, together with all other owners of the Juab Gypsum, L.L.C."
from contacting or contracting with Ashgrove Cement Company-Durkee,
Oregon, which was an existing customer of defendants, "for a period
of eighteen months from the date of the parties [sic] Stipulation
(February

12, 1996) or

for so long as the gypsum

from Nephi

Sandstone's operation of the Salt Creek Mine continues to meet
Ashgrove Cement , s specifications, whichever is later."

(R. 143.)

The trial court found that in the spring of 1996, which was almost
immediately
contacted

after

the

stipulation

Ashgrove-Durkee,

and

in

was

entered,

October,

J.

1996,

railroad carloads of gypsum to Ashgrove-Durkee.

W.

Dansie

shipped

19

(R. 281-280.)

After making the agreement to ship the gypsum, J. W. Dansie learned
of two circumstances which he later claimed constituted a failure
to meet Ashgrove-Durkee7s specifications.

9

The trial court found

that Nephi

Sandstone had not failed to meet

Ashgrove-Durkee's

specifications.
In addition to imposing a sanction for the past violation of
the order, the trial court entered an injunction to prevent J. W.
Dansie from committing future violations of the order.
simply

required

specification

violation

Ashgrove-Durkee.
injunction.*

that J.

W.

Dansie

before

obtain

undertaking

a court
to

The court
finding

of

gypsum

to

ship

J. W. Dansie now challenges that preventative

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

entering that order under the circumstances of this case.
The propriety of an injunction restraining competition

is

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion.
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983).

System

It cannot

be said that the trial court abused its discretion in this case.
J. W. Dansie had already demonstrated his contempt by violating at
least two provisions of the June 18, 1996, Order.

The court's

finding demonstrates a need for close court supervision to prevent
further violations:
At least as to J. W. , this is not a
particularly close case. In observing him at
the evidentiary hearing and listening to his
explanations of his actions, it is clear that
he has an animus toward his son and son-in-law
(defendants) . He saw a sliver of an excuse to
reenter the gypsum market in competition with
them, and he loaded up his railcars and
crashed them through that sliver into the
broad
daylight.
J.
W.
evidenced
no
recognition
of
any
wrongdoing,
and
he
demonstrated an attitude of disregard for the

legal obligations imposed upon him by
agreement, which he reached with his son
son-in-law (defendants). The Court finds
concludes that J. W. is in contempt of
C o u r t s order.

the
and
and
the

(R. 270.)
The court also found what it characterized as "disturbing"
violations of the order to not make derogatory comments about other
parties.

(R. 269-268.)

This case arises out of a dispute among

family members, and the trial court characterizes it as a "sad
case."

(R.

253.)

Perhaps

most

instructive

is

the

court's

explanation for denying J. W. Dansie's motion for a new trial:
Second, it is troubling that after his
counsel helped him negotiate a settlement with
his son and son-in-law, after he signed the
agreement, after it was presented to the Court
as his voluntary agreement and after it was
incorporated into an order of the Court, at
the first opportunity J. W. Dansie set about
to violate the court order. His defense is
that it contains an invalid non-competition
agreement.
This case as [sic] far different from the
usual non-competition agreement case for the
simple reason that we are not considering
whether
J.
W.
Dansie
violated
a noncompetition agreement, but whether J. W.
Dansie violated an order of this Court.
In
this case I am called upon to construe and
enforce a court order rather than a private
agreement.
And I have found clear and
convincing evidence that J. W. Dansie did
violate the order. While J. W. Dansie asserts
that the order contains an invalid provision,
his remedy is not to thumb his nose at the
agreement for which he bargained or at the
Court which issued the order, but to seek
relief from the Court.
Instead he chose a
path of contempt.
(R. 340-339.)
11

Where J. W. Dansie had clearly demonstrated his propensity to
use any excuse to violate the prior court order, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in requiring prior court approval
before J. W. Dansie could undertake sales to Ashgrove-Durkee.

The

trial court's order should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE RESTRAINT ON COMPETITION WAS NOT UNREASONABLE.
J. W. Dansie did not appeal from the June 18, 1996, Order
which prohibited him from making sales to Ashgrove-Durkee until
after the passage of 18 months or until Nephi Sandstone's gypsum
failed to meet Ashgrove-Durkee7s specifications, whichever occurred
later.

J. W. Dansie also did not challenge the trial court's

denial of his motion to amend that earlier order.

J. W. Dansie

nonetheless claims that the provisions of that June 18, 1996,
Order, which were enforced by the order appealed from, constitute
an illegal non-competition "agreement."

Although the Court lacks

jurisdiction to consider this claim, if the Court were to reach the
issue, it should hold that the provision is proper.
To be enforceable, a non-competition agreement must

(1) by

supported by consideration, (2) not be a product of bad faith, (3)
be necessary to protect the good will of the business, and (4) "be
reasonable

in its restrictions as to time and area."

System

Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425-26 (Utah 1983), citing
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 237 P.2d

12

823, 828

(1951) . The only element at issue here is the fourth one, whether
the restriction as to time and area is reasonable.
The law recognizes two types of covenants not to compete:
covenants not to compete between an employer and employee, and
covenants not to complete following a transfer or conveyance of
ownership of a business.

Covenants in the first category are

strictly construed, while covenants of the second category are not.
Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 224 (Nev. 1979); Amex Distributing
Co. v. Mascari, 724 P.2d 596, 602 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); DBA
Enterprises, Inc. v. Findlay, 923 P.2d 298, 302 (Ct. App.), cert,
denied (Colo. 1996).
J. W. Dansie claims that the court order imposed an indefinite3 restriction on competition and asserts that such restrictions are invalid.
his claim:

J. W. Dansie relies on three cases to support

Three Phoenix Co. v. Pace Industries, Inc., 659 P.2d

1271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Gynecologic Oncology, P.C. v. Weiser,
443 S.E.2d 526 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); National Graphics Co. v.
Dilley, 681 P.2d 546 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).

Of these cases, only

Three Phoenix arises in the context of the sale of a business, and

defendants do not agree that the restriction was for an
indefinite period of time. Craig and Bruce presented evidence that
the gypsum from the Salt Creek Mine would likely last only two to
three years. (R. 265-264.) The trial court made no finding on
this issue. If this Court should determine that some restriction
as to time is required, the matter should be remanded for a
determination of how long the Salt Creek Mine gypsum supply will
last, and whether that constitutes a reasonable limitation on the
non-competition provision.
13

that opinion was vacated by the Arizona Supreme Court.

Three

Phoenix Co. v. Pace Industries, Inc., 659 P.2d 1258 (Ariz. 1983).
More importantly, the principle reflected in these cases is a
minority view.

"The overwhelming majority of the cases lend

support to the rule that the mere fact, standing alone, that a
restrictive covenant not to compete, ancillary to a contract of
sale or other transfer of property, contains no time limit does not
render the restriction ipso facto enforceable."

Annot., Enforce-

ability of covenant against competition, ancillary to sale or other
transfer

of business, practice, or property, as affected by

duration of restriction, 45 A.L.R.2d 77, 105 (1956).

The majority

rule was applied in Utah in Lashus v. Chamberlain, 6 Utah 385, 24
P.

188

(1890),

which

enforced

an

indefinite

restriction

on

operating a competing hotel business in Ogden.
This is consistent with the decision in System Concepts, Inc.
v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983), which involved the corollary
concept of a non-compete agreement with no restriction as to area
but a short restriction as to time.

The court held that "[t]he

reasonableness of the restraints in a restrictive covenant is
determined

on a case-by-case basis, taking

into account the

particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case and the
subject covenant."

669 P.2d at 427.

In that case, the entire

market was approximately 2,500 potential customers worldwide.

In

light of the narrow market, the court held that an unlimited
territorial restriction was not unreasonable:
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"Furthermore, the

breadth of the covenant is sufficiently limited by the specific
activity restrictions, which, under the peculiar circumstances of
this case, have greater utility and propriety
restriction."

than a

spacial

Id.

In the instant case, the challenged order prohibits sales to
a single division of a single company.
restriction could hardly be imagined.
existing customer of Nephi Sandstone.

A more narrow spacial
Ashgrove-Durkee was an
Given the unique circum-

stances of this case, it was not unreasonable for the court to
prohibit J. W. Dansie from interfering with that single customer
for an indefinite period of time.

The judgment of the trial court

should be affirmed.
POINT III
APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.
The trial court properly awarded defendants part of their
attorney fees incurred in defending this case, and J. W. Dansie has
not challenged the award on appeal.

This Court should direct that

appellees be awarded their attorney fees incurred in defending the
appeal, the amount to be determined by the trial court on remand.
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406,
409 (Utah 1980).
CONCLUSION
It was reasonable for the trial court to require J. W. Dansie
to seek prior court approval of any claim that defendants had
failed to meet Ashgrove-Durkee specifications for gypsum.
15

Indeed,

given

J.

W.

Dansie's

prior

history

of

contempt,

any

lesser

is viewed

as in-

requirement may have been unreasonable.
Even

if the restriction

on competition

definite, it is enforceable because the scope of restriction is
limited to only one potential customer.

The judgment of the trial

court should be affirmed in all respects, and appellees should be
awarded their attorney fees incurred on appeal.
DATED this

^9^

day of June, 1998.
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